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 Non-Technical Summary 
After years of steady growth the volume of bank credit to German enterprises has 
been continuously falling nearly every quarter from the second quarter of 2001 on to 
the last quarter of 2004. The coincidence of this credit market development with the 
burst of the technology bubble on the stock markets has raised some suspicion that 
inter alia the stock market downturn has had a negative impact on banks’ lending 
behaviour.  
The paper analyses this topic from three different perspectives: In the first part of the 
paper we scrutinize the impact of stock market movements on the banks´ balance 
sheet. In the second part we analyse whether stock markets influence liquity and de-
fault risk of corporate borrowers. In the third part we finally estimate aggregate 
credit supply and demand functions including a stock market indicator as explana-
tory variable. 
In the first part of our paper, our analysis - concerning the factual impact of the bal-
ance sheet channel, future threats to the balance sheet and the banks‘ operating strain 
– revealed no major importance of the bank balance sheet channel for the analysis of 
the relationship between stock market volatility and corporate financing possibilities 
of non-financial companies.  
However, a possible impact of stock market movements on banks´ lending behav-
iour might be rooted in their impact on the balance sheets of corporate borrowers. 
While a downturn in stock prices typically does not lead to a major deterioration of 
the liquidity of a company, there is a high impact on the default risk of a company 
perceived by market participants. This is certainly the case for listed corporations, 
which can, however, have follow-on effects on the valuation of non-listed compa-
nies as well. Since default risk makes up a major part of credit risk, the degree of 
default risk inherent to a company therefore crucially determines their creditworthi-
ness. Consequently, the corporate balance sheet channel has to be regarded as a 
channel of high influence on loans granted by banks.  
Overall, the results of the time series analysis yield some evidence that the stock 
market development has an impact on the credit volume in Germany. The result for 
the estimated supply and demand functions show some improvement, particularly 
for the Großbanken (big commercial banks), when a stock market variable is in-
cluded. This supports the view that the stock market development might be more 
relevant for the lending behaviour of the Großbanken than for other banks because 
the Großbanken derive more of their income from stock market related activities. 
This result is in general confirmed by an additional simultaneous estimation of de-
mand and supply functions in a disequilibrium model. 
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Abstract  
The paper analyses the potential impact of stock market developments on lending 
behaviour from different perspectives. First we scrutinize the impact of stock market 
movements on the banks’ and on the borrowers’ balance sheets. Subsequently we 
estimate aggregate credit supply and demand functions including a stock market in-
dicator as explanatory variable. The analysis reveals no major importance of the 
bank balance sheet channel for the relationship between stock market volatility and 
corporate financing possibilities of non-financial companies. A possible impact of 
stock market movements on banks´ lending behaviour might be rooted in their im-
pact on the balance sheets of corporate borrowers. The empirical results of the credit 
market analysis yield some confirming evidence for an impact of stock market de-
velopments. However, the results are not very stable and depend on the specification 
of the model and on the time period under observation.  
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1 Introduction 
After years of steady growth the volume of bank credit to German enterprises has 
been continuously falling nearly every quarter from the second quarter of 2001 on to 
the last quarter of 2004. The coincidence of this credit market development with the 
burst of the technology bubble on the stock markets has raised some suspicion that 
inter alia the stock market downturn has had a negative impact on banks’ lending 
behaviour.  
The following paper analyses this topic from three different perspectives: In the first 
part of the paper we scrutinize the impact of stock market movements on the banks´ 
balance sheet. In the second part we analyse whether stock markets influence liquity 
and default risk of corporate borrowers. In the third part we finally estimate aggre-
gate credit supply and demand functions including a stock market indicator as ex-
planatory variable. 
2 The banks‘ balance sheet channel 
2.1 Theoretical foundation 
Banks‘ corporate financing activities can be classified in either equity investments or 
debt investments, with usually debt investments in the form of common loans 
granted to companies as by far the dominating investment style. Independently of 
the type of investment, such financing activities are regarded as risk assets of a bank 
in the sense of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, KWG).1 Pursuant to 
the section 10 of the KWG and the Principle 1 (Grundsatz 1) of the BAFin, banks 
are required to back at least 8% of its weighted risk assets with own funds (capital). 
Own funds consist of tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital approximately 
equals shareholders equity plus the special fund for general banking risks (pursuant 
to Section 340g of the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB)) less 
goodwill. Tier 2 capital comprises supplementary capital items such as subordinated 
debt, loan reserves, and other sorts of long-term capital that is not equity.2 It is also 
worth noting that at least half of the own funds must come from tier 1 capital.3 
                                           
1  For a detailed description of what qualifies to be a risk asset, see Hartmann-
Wendels/Pfingsten/Weber (2000), p. 366-370. 
2  See Bieg (1998), pp. 782-783, Bundesbank (2002), pp. 43. 
3  See Hartmann-Wendels/Pfingsten/Weber (2000), p. 371. 
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Figure 1: The breakdown of own funds of German banks (2000). 
Own funds of German banks (december 2000) 
tier 1
62%
tier 2
35%
tier 3
3%
total: 353 bill. €
Source: Bundesbank (2002)
 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between tier 1, tier 2 and tier 3 capital for all Ger-
man banks on an aggregated level. Tier 3 capital mainly consists of certain short-
term subordinated debt; it is not part of a bank’s capital in the sense of the KWG and 
therefore does not qualify to back risk assets. The figure shows that it is usually not 
a problem for banks to fulfil the requirement that 50% of capital have to be tier 1 
capital. Nevertheless, it depends on the capital structure of each bank, whether this 
rule effectively limits the amount of loans grantable. 
The consequence for corporate financing, that arise from Principle 1 and the KWG 
rules, is, that the amount of banks‘ own funds definitely poses an upper limit to the 
funds available to companies. To put it more clearly, total loans cannot exceed 12.5 
times banks‘ own funds since otherwise the 8-percent rule is broken. Obviously, the 
more own funds a banks possesses the more there is scope for corporate financing 
activities and vice versa. This restriction is not of major impact if banks‘ debt in-
vestment set is rather small. This could be the case if new debt investments are not 
attractive on a single company level (bad rating results for that company)4 or if new 
debt investments do not fit into the existing loan portfolio. However, this restriction 
highly influences the investment behaviour of banks if they face favourable invest-
ment opportunities with lots of „good“ potential debtors.  
Stock market volatility might impact the amount of own funds especially via share-
holders equity which is a major part of own funds. Shareholders equity is influenced 
by operating activities either directly by reducing or increasing the equity account or 
indirectly by flowing through the income statement into the retained earnings ac-
                                           
4  In this context it is important to note, that banks do not automatically respond with higher inter-
est rates to a higher rikiness of the loan. They rather stop lending when rates exceed a certain 
threshold since high interest rates disproportionately attract bad debtors (see Stiglitz/Weiss 
1981). 
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count. We did not identify any direct impacts on shareholders equity, but there are 
many items of the income statement that are affected by stock market volatility. In 
general, income and retained earnings are lower in times of low stock prices and 
vice versa. However, a deeper examination is necessary to quantify the influence of 
stock market volatility on shareholders equity, on banks‘ own funds and finally on 
corporate financing possibilities of SMEs. This is done below from two different 
perspectives. First, we analyse how stock market volatility has actually been mir-
rored on the balance sheet until the end of the stock market downturn in 2000. Sec-
ond, we determine – as of the year 2001 – the threat of future equity decreases due 
to historic management discretion. The latter analysis is necessary since German 
GAAP allows for several accounting choices and therefore financial statements do 
not necessarily reflect accurately the real economic situation. 
Both analyses are performed on an aggregated level for all German banks. Due to a 
lack of data availability we can not conduct our examinations separately for single 
classes of banks (i.e. commercial banks, savings banks, etc.). However, our general 
results are largely – albeit not perfectly – valid for commercial banks, since this 
group of banks owns more than the half of all stocks held by all banks. In contrast, it 
is not possible to draw any direct conclusions on the individual behaviour of groups 
of banks other than commercial banks. 
2.2 The past and current impact on corporate financing activities 
The analysis of the banks‘ balance sheet channel vis-à-vis the stock market volatility 
proceeds as follows: First, we analyse how the stock market related operating in-
come of banks has impact on shareholders equity (and on banks‘ own funds) in each 
year. Second, we make a projection of what that means for corporate financing ac-
tivities of non-financial companies. The data for that examination are drawn from 
the German Bankenstatistik and the German Ertragslage der deutschen Kreditinsti-
tute that are both published yearly by the German Bundesbank.5 The sources provide 
for all German Banks the aggregated amounts of several items of the consolidated 
balance sheet and of the most important positions of the consolidated income state-
ment. The aggregation of these items and positions is not biased by different ac-
counting standards, since all banks under examination disclose their financial state-
ments according to the accounting rules of the German Commercial Code (below: 
German GAAP). Index prices are provided by Thompson Financial Datastream. 
A major problem in our analysis is that it is not possible to exactly identify the part 
of the operational business that is related to the stock market. Two reasons are re-
sponsible for that: First, banks‘ disclosure requirements are such that they do not 
have to isolate the stock market related business but rather exhibit a functional clas-
                                           
5  Both data sources are published as part of the Monatsbericht of the German Bundesbank. 
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sification. As a consequence, many stock market related expenses are „hidden“ 
within other positions. This becomes obvious when exemplarily looking at the posi-
tion „Write-downs and value adjustments on investments, holdings in subsidiary 
companies and securities treated as fixed assets“ (position 15 of the income state-
ment). This position includes depreciation expenses for shares held as fixed assets 
but also for other securities like debentures. Even write-downs on off-capital mar-
kets investments are considered in this position. Similar problems hold for other 
stock market related expenses. Another example would be the position „Write-
downs and value adjustments on loans and certain securities and increase of allow-
ances for possible loan losses“ (position 13 of the income statement). This position 
comprises mainly the depreciation on certain corporate debt, but also those on shares 
held in the liquidity reserve of the bank..6 Revenues are also affected by this isola-
tion problem – however to a lesser extent than expenses. Additional problems arise 
because some positions of the income statement may be affected by the stock market 
development even if they are not obviously stock market related. For example, the 
allocations to the fund for general bank risks grow as the general credit quality of 
companies decreases. A decrease of the loan quality is in turn often correlated with a 
downturn on equity capital markets.7 Second, only quantitative financial statement 
data are available for this analysis. Qualitative financial data like those that are typi-
cally disclosed in the notes of the financial statement are not available on an aggre-
gated level. However, the value-added that the inclusion of certain qualitative finan-
cial data would provide, is very low for the analysis of the balance sheet channel. 
Below the calculation of the stock market related operations along with the assump-
tions made is described. 
Net revenues from stock market related operations especially comprise the „Net 
commission income“ (positions 5 and 6 of the income statement) and the „Net profit 
on financial operations“ (position 7 of the income statement). The first one denotes 
the surplus of all commission income over commission expenses. Net commission 
income includes income from e.g. payment transactions, procurement, underwriting 
and advisory services. We assume that most of this income is stock market related 
and therefore we include it completely into our analysis. However, we are aware that 
this inclusion tends to overstate the stock market related income. The second posi-
tion – Net profit on financial operations – consists of the income surplus generated 
by proprietary trading (especially gains from the sale of securities held for trading). 
Certainly, income from operations with precious metal, foreign currencies and bonds 
is part of this position, but actually income from shares makes up the biggest part of 
it. Thus, the total inclusion of this position only slightly overstates the income from 
stock market related operations. 
                                           
6  See Bieg (1998), p. 353. 
7  See Section 2. 
 5
Typical expenses related to stock market operations are the write-downs on shares. 
German GAAP requires a valuation at the „lower of cost or market“ for all assets 
(section 253, German Commercial Code). That means that securities classified as 
current assets are disclosed at cost, unless they are written down to the lower end-of-
year closing market price (strict „lower of cost or market“-principle, according to 
section 253 (3) 1 and 2 HGB). Securities classified as fixed assets have to be written 
down only if it is expected that the market price permanently falls short of cost. If, 
however, the market price is expected to only temporarily fall below cost, then man-
agement has an option to write down (moderated „lower of cost or market“-
principle, according to section 253 (2) 3 HGB in conjunction with section 279 (1) 2 
HGB). If formerly written-down securities recover value, upward revaluation is 
permitted only up to cost; a market value higher than cost is ignored on the balance 
sheet. 
For our purposes, especially the „Write-downs and value adjustments on invest-
ments, holdings in subsidiary companies and securities treated as fixed assets“ (posi-
tion 15 in the income statement) are of importance. We assume that the most part of 
this position is stock market related. This is reasonable because not listed invest-
ments typically lack a clear benchmark which indicates that depreciation should take 
place. Certainly, the losses of subsidiaries valued at equity or at the consolidation 
method also have impact on this position but we assume that the amount is negligi-
ble. Furthermore, the write-down of shares held for trading (if there is any write-
down) is included in the net profit on financial operations and is therefore already 
accounted for. The write-down of shares held in the liquidity reserve is hidden in 
another position in the income statement.8 However, since these shares only make 
up a little part of all shares, a suppression of this account does not cause major prob-
lems. Thus, the inclusion of position 15 of the income statement is a reasonable 
proxy for depreciation of stock listed equity securities. 
An additional source of potential stock market related income is the „Income from 
the writing back of investments, holdings in subsidiary companies and securities 
treated as fixed assets“ (position 16 of the income statement). This kind of income 
does not only consist of the writing back of previously depreciated assets (no change 
of ownership) but also of the gain on the sale of assets (change of ownership).9 
Typically, the writing back of previously depreciated assets requires a slump in asset 
prices followed by a rebound. This has not been the case at international stock mar-
kets for the period under examination and the years before examination. In fact, 
rather the opposite is true: A rise in the market has been followed by a decrease of 
stock prices (see figure 2). Therefore most of these profits must stem from the sale 
of assets. Certainly, the profits of subsidiaries valued at equity or at the consolidated 
                                           
8  See Bieg (1998), p. 353. 
9  See Bieg (1998), p. 365. 
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method also have impact on this position but we assume that the amount is negligi-
ble. Additionally, it can be assumed that the biggest part of the write-ups is made for 
shares or at least for stock market listed investments. This is because management 
tends to primarily sell financial assets rather than strategic assets. However, the gen-
eral price level at capital markets also impacts the prices of private investments and 
subsidiary companies. Thus, the amount of write-ups for these off-market items is to 
a large extent also due to the stock market development. Consequently, this position 
of the income statement can be regarded as stock market related income. 
Figure 2: Development of the Dax index (1990-2003) 
Chart of the Dax (1990-2003)
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Source: Thomson Financial Datastream 
However, the nature of this position differs a great deal from that of the two posi-
tions mentioned above. The profits from write-ups (i.e. from the sale of shares) are 
not part of the periodic business of a company, they are rather non-recurring. There-
fore this position must be treated as a „extraordinary“ stock market related income 
source: management has the choice but not the duty to release hidden reserves and to 
create income via the sale of shares. This extraordinary nature is accounted for in 
our analysis by calculating two variants of income from stock market operations: 
ordinary income and income including extraordinary items. In doing this, we can 
analyse how management has the possibility to influence the impact of stock market 
related operations. 
The amount of own funds is proxied by adding the shareholders equity account and 
the special fund for general banking risks pursuant to Section 340g, German Com-
mercial Code. This approximation is widely consistent with the simplified calcula-
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tion of banks‘ capital used by the Bundesbank.10 Finally, the contribution of stock 
market related income to own funds is calculated for each year as a percentage num-
ber. This is done in two steps. In a first step, the part of retained earnings that is due 
to stock market related operations is determined by applying the company’s reten-
tion rate on the after tax profits from stock market related operations (hypothetical 
taxation is performed at the marginal tax rate of the company). In a second step, this 
amount is put into relation of the banks‘ own funds. This ratio effectively shows, 
how much of the capital available to back risk assets of the bank is financed by stock 
market related income. Figure 3 provides a schematic view on the calculation of 
both the contribution ratio from ordinary operations and the contribution ratio in-
cluding extraordinary income. Figure 4 depicts the development of the two ratios for 
the year 1994-2002. A detailed calculation of both ratios can be found in appendix 
6.1. It is important to recall, that all these ratios represent the maximum impact on 
banks‘ own funds, since our calculations tended to overstate the income from stock 
market related operations.  
Figure 3: Calculation scheme for contribution ratios 
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10  See e.g. Bundesbank (2003a), p. 11, 13, 15. 
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Source: ZEW 
Figure 4: Contribution ratios from stock market related operations to own funds (1993-2002) 
Contribution from stock market related operations to own funds
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Source: Bundesbank, Thomson Financial Datastream 
Figure 4 reveals that the factual contribution ratio (including extraordinary income) 
steadily increased during the boom years 1994 – 2000. This is largely also true for 
the ordinary contribution ratio even if it experienced a small backslide in 1998. 
However, as of the year 2001, the spread between the two ratios widened. While the 
ordinary ratio declined according to the development of the capital market, the fac-
tual contribution ratio approximately kept its level in 2001 and only slightly de-
creased in 2002. This gives rise to the assumption that management operationally 
smoothed earnings with non-core business activities during the years 2001 and 2002 
and – as a consequence – kept the factual contribution ratio artificially high. It has to 
be concluded, that obviously management has an option to influence the contribu-
tion of stock market related income on net income, shareholders‘ equity and own 
funds to a certain degree and that management effectively exercises this option if it 
is deep enough „in-the-money“, i.e. if it promises to noticeably improve the eco-
nomic situation of the bank.11 That in turn might lead to the suggestion that the stock 
                                           
11  In general, income smoothing is defined as discretionary management behaviour in financial 
reporting to reduce the time-series variation in income (see Zarowin 2002). In contrast to that 
common financial view, our approach rather focuses on „operational“ income smoothing. Nev-
ertheless, in any case management‘s motivation of smoothing income is to make the company 
more attractive to stakeholders and shareholders, hoping that they do not detect this kind of 
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market development does not have a material influence on corporate financing ac-
tivities of non-financial companies – at least in terms of banks‘ balance sheet chan-
nel. But let us take a closer look on the consequences for the fund raising of compa-
nies to quantify the effects of this channel. 
With regard to the ordinary contribution ratio, we can see that it decreased between 
2000 and 2002 from 4.15 to 2.61. This lowering of the contribution ratio results in 
relatively lower own funds of banks. More precisely, the difference between the 
capital in both years amounts  
(1 0.0415)1 1.58%
(1 0.0261)
−− =−   
That means, ceteris paribus the amount of equity has been about 1.6 per cent lower 
in 2002 than it would have been if income from stock market related operations had 
remained stable between 2000 and 2002. This in turn means that the maximum 
grantable loan amount is reduced by approximately 1.6 per cent since banks‘ own 
funds restrict the amount of risk assets of a bank. Considering that the total amount 
of bank loans was 3,016,941 mio. Euro in 200212, banks in Germany could have 
granted additional loans amounting to 
0.0158 3,016,941 .€ 48,432.91 .€
1 0.0158
mio mio⋅ =− . 
It is important to note that this calculation only holds if we assume that banks are 
restricted in their operating efforts by the amount of own funds, i.e. banks would 
like to hold more than the maximum acceptable amount of risk assets (pursuant to 
the Principle 1 of the BAFin) in all years. 
Actually, banks did not realise the ordinary contribution ratio but the contribution 
ratio including extraordinary items. As regards this ratio the results are quite differ-
ent. The difference in own funds between the year 2000 and the year 2002 only 
yields  
(1 0.0444)1 0.53%
(1 0.0393)
−− =− . 
                                                                                                                                          
earnings management (see Healy/Wahlen 2000). The stabilisation of the contribution ratios is 
just a by-product of this behaviour. 
12  See Bundesbank (2003a), p. 6. This number includes all loans granted to non monetary finan-
cial institutions (non MFIs).  
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Using this number to calculate the relative amount of loans that banks could have 
granted more in 2002 – assuming profits related to stock market operations being 
equal to 2000 – we get:  
0.0053 3,016,941 .€ 16,074.98 .€
1 0.0053
mio mio⋅ =− . 
This is about one third of the amount calculated with the hypothetical ordinary con-
tribution ratio. Again, this calculation is economically significant only if banks 
would like to take on more than the maximum acceptable amount of risk assets in all 
years. Table 1 summarizes the effects of the bank balance sheet channel, illustrated 
by a comparison between the boom year 2000 (with high contribution ratios) and the 
year 2002 (with very low contribution ratios after the downdraft of markets). 
Table 1:  Factual impact of the balance sheet channel on SME corporate financing activi-
ties (comparison between 2000 and 2002) 
 Δ (2000; 2002); AOTBE 
Ratio underlying the estimation Own funds 
(in %-terms) 
Loans grantable 
Ordinary contribution ratio 1.58 ca. 48 bill. € 
Contribution ratio including extraord. 
items 
0.53 ca. 16 bill. € 
  
To conclude: analysis of the years 1994-2002 reveals that the importance of the 
banks‘ balance sheet channel is limited when assessing the impact of stock market 
volatility on SME corporate financing activities. Two reasons are considerably re-
sponsible for that. First, the contribution of stock market related income to banks‘ 
own funds is rather small over the whole period (between 2 and 5 percent). Second, 
the contribution ratio (including extraordinary income) actually did not change very 
much after the downturn of stock markets in 2001; i.e. it seems to be quite robust to 
stock market volatility. 
Nevertheless, two questions arise from this analysis: Can banks infinitely continue 
to smooth earnings via the sale of shares? And: Are there any negative effects of the 
decrease in stock prices, that are not yet considered on the balance sheet and might 
probably influence banks‘ amount of own funds during the next years? We address 
these issues in the following section by shedding more light on the expected future 
development of the „Income from the writing back of investments, holdings in sub-
sidiary companies and securities treated as fixed assets“ and the „Write-downs and 
value adjustments on investments, holdings in subsidiary companies and securities 
treated as fixed assets“. 
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2.3 Future threats to corporate financing possibilities 
As has been shown above, banks are likely to have smoothed income with off-core 
business items like asset sales during the years 2001 and 2002. In having done that, 
the impact of the stock market downturn on banks‘ equity has noticeably been sof-
tened. The big problem with that kind of „operational smoothing“ is that banks need 
a sufficient amount of assets with a balance sheet value lower than the economic 
value (this difference is called the hidden reserve of the asset). Even if historical cost 
accounting – most developed accounting systems like German GAAP, US-GAAP 
and IAS/IFRS use historical cost accounting – typically supports the creation of hid-
den reserves, they are not inexhaustively available. 
More precisely, banks do not have the possibility to smooth earnings every year to 
the same extent, since the potential for income smoothing with asset sales is path 
dependent. This path dependency especially becomes manifest in that banks suffer 
from a „hidden reserve burnout“ after a sharp drop in stock prices; i.e. the more 
banks smooth earnings with the sale of low-purchase-price stock today the less they 
have the possibility to smooth earnings in the future, because they are running dan-
ger that they simply run out of low-purchase-price shares. 
An additional threat to banks‘ own funds is that the stock account might probably be 
written down in the future due to incidents that have already happened in the past. 
This becomes clearer when looking at a concrete example: Imagine a bank that has 
purchased shares at a high price level during the boom years. Probably these shares 
have lost value during the last years but are not written down yet. This is a probable 
scenario because banks (as well as non-financial companies) have certain discretion 
of when to write down assets, as has been outlined above. However, this discretion 
is not unlimited. There might be a certain event that triggers the writing down, 
which would lead to a decrease in shareholders equity via the retained earnings ac-
count and therefore would affect own funds. 
While relatively generous in the past, the accounting for share depreciation has be-
come a little stricter during the last years. Until the year 2001, banks (and auditors) 
only had to rely on some kind of „prudent businessman“-rule in deciding when 
shares have permanently fallen short of cost. There were no concrete indicators that 
could help in this decision. However, this estimation is a crucial point in asset valua-
tion since the existence of a permanent decline in value would lead to a write-down 
of shares that are classified as fixed assets (according to section 253 HGB). In 2002, 
the equity instrument accounting of insurance companies has been adjusted so that it 
now approximately equals the share accounting of banks (amendment of section 
341b HGB13). In connection with that, the German Accountants Association (Institut 
der Deutschen Wirtschaftsprüfer, IDW) disclosed some guidelines on how to deal 
                                           
13  See Bundesgesetzblatt I (2002), pp. 1219ff. 
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with the new accounting rules.14 The indicators described there, represent an en-
hancement of the existing Commercial Code rules, but they are still very general in 
nature and by far not exhaustive. Thus, there is still room for management discre-
tion.15 Also important to note that – strictly speaking – these indicators only apply to 
insurance companies. However, it must be assumed that these guidelines will not be 
without impact on the future accounting for shares of non-insurance companies like 
banks and industrial companies. As a consequence, it has to be stated, that the prob-
ability of future share write-downs for either company – banks, insurance and indus-
trial companies – has increased. This increase becomes even more probable when 
considering that many banks are expected to change from accounting using German 
GAAP to accounting using IAS/IFRS during the next years. Such a change would 
inescapably lead to a revaluation of shares and thus to a write-down to fair market 
values whenever book value exceeds the then prevailing market value. 
The assessment of the magnitude of such probable future write-downs requires a 
closer look at the banks‘ share account. A major problem in determining the amount 
of shares that might probably be depreciated in future is that even if the current €-
amount of shares is known, there are typically no data about the cost at which the 
single shares are purchased historically. However, the knowledge of historical share 
purchase prices is crucial in this examination. We approach this task by simulating 
different developments of the share account over time. To do this, we have to rely on 
certain assumptions of which the most important are: 
- Banks are only investing into a portfolio that mimics the Dax index. This as-
sumption considers that on an aggregate level the share portfolio is most likely 
broadly diversified. It does not explicitly consider an international diversification 
but that does not influence the quality of the analysis. Moreover, the results 
would not change dramatically if the reference portfolio consists of a global mar-
ket index because stock movements have been quite similar for the major interna-
tional indices. 
- Securities are purchased and sold only at the last trading day of the year, i.e. de-
cember 29, 30 or 31 respectively. 
- The average historical share purchase price of all securities bought before 1994 is 
1.000 (in terms of the Dax level). This is quite reasonable, because German 
banks were not very active in securities trading before the stock market boom of 
the 1990s and thus most shares are purchased a long time ago. 
- The whole position 16 of the income statement („Income from the writing back 
of investments, holdings in subsidiary companies and securities treated as fixed 
assets“) consists of gains from the sale of shares. The whole position 15 of the 
                                           
14  See IDW (2002), pp. 475-477. 
15  See Boersen-Zeitung (2002) 
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income statement („Write-downs and value adjustments on investments, holdings 
in subsidiary companies and securities treated as fixed assets“) is related to 
shares or stock listed investments. See the outlines in section 2.2 regarding the re-
liability of this assumption. 
One might think that these are quite a lot of very strict adhoc-assumptions, but they 
are necessary since the data available do not provide all the information we need for 
the examination. Additionally, the focus of this second part of the analysis of the 
bank balance sheet channel is on qualitative rather than on quantitative characteris-
tics. Thus, minor differences between our calculations and economic reality are tol-
erable as long as the tendencies are identical.  
Scenario analysis is used to account for different strategies of banks about which 
kind of shares to be sold. Some banks might prefer to sell shares first that have been 
originally purchased at a relatively high price (and that offer only a small gain per 
share upon sale since the spread between selling and purchase price is narrow). Con-
trary to that, other banks rather prefer to sell low-purchase-price shares. For our 
analysis we established three different scenarios, each with a different trading strat-
egy. The first strategy is following the lowest in – first out (LoFo) principle; the sec-
ond one uses the highest in – first out (HiFo) principle. The third one assumes that 
banks sell shares each year at an equal €-amount from each layer16 (with a change to 
LoFo in 2002, since otherwise the reported gains on the sale of shares cannot be re-
alised). Some minor deviations from these strategies are necessary to reach consis-
tency with the financial statement data. Whenever they occur, it is indicated in the 
footnotes of the calculation scheme of the respective strategy in the appendix 6.2. 
Our analysis starts with the share account in the year 1994 (where all securities are 
assumed to be valued at cost=1.000). From this year on, the effects of the different 
trading strategies of banks on the development of the share account are examined. 
More precisely, for every single year the examination proceeds as follows: In a first 
step we calculate the gain on the sale of shares for a single unit of shares (i.e. the 
gain on the sale of shares in terms of Dax Index points). This gain equals the differ-
ence between the value of the index at the end of the year (the selling price of the 
shares) and the historical purchase price of the shares to be sold. The average his-
torical purchase price of the shares sold differs dependent on which trading strategy 
the banks follow. For the „equally selling“ strategy it is calculated as the unweighted 
average price of all layers that exist at the time of sale (including the purchases of 
the current year). E.g., in the year 1994 it is the mean of 1.000 (all shares purchased 
before 1994) and 2.107 (purchase price in 1994) which yields approximately 1.553. 
For the LoFo-scenario it is 1.000 throughout the whole period under examination, 
since exclusively those shares are sold that are purchased before 1994 and this layer 
still comprises shares at the end of 2002. For the HiFo-scenario the proceeding is a 
                                           
16  A layer consists of all shares purchased at an identical price. 
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little bit different. More precisely, in general the average historical purchase price 
equals the price of the highest-purchase-price layer. If, however, the sales of shares 
exceed the €-amount of shares in the respective layer, also shares from the next to 
highest-price layer and probably of the second next to highest-price layer have to be 
sold. Thus, depending on the amount of shares available in the respective layers the 
historical purchase price either equals the purchase price of the highest-price layer or 
is some kind of average price of two – sometimes three – layers. 
In a second step we calculate the €-amount of sales of shares necessary to realise the 
reported gain on sales. Finally, we determine the amount of shares that have to be 
purchased to yield the reported end of year share account value. These purchased 
shares represent a new layer with the layer-price equalling the end of year level of 
the Dax. The calculation procedure is shown in details in figure 6. 
This procedure is repeated for every year under examination with the respective 
numbers. The final result is the structure of the share account at the end of the year 
2002. The development over the years and the final result is provided in the figures 
7-9. A detailed calculation scheme for each of the three strategies can be found in 
appendix 6.2.  
Figure 5: Calculation scheme for yearly share purchases 
 
Ending period share account 
- Beginning period share account 
+ Depreciation on shares 
+ 
Decrease in share account due
to sales 
(+)   Share purchases
= (-)    Share sales 
Calculation scheme for yearly share purchases / sales 
 Gain on the sale of shares (total)
: Gain on the sale of shares (per
unit )a
= Units   sold    a
* Av. hist.purchase price of
shares sold 
Decrease in share account 
due to sales 
= 
   one unit equals the amount of shares 
that are worth  
a  
Dax level (dec. 31) 
Av.hist. purchase price of 
shares sold 
Gain on the sale of 
shares (per unit ) a 
=
- 
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Figure 6:  Banks‘ share account (1993-2002) following the „Lowest in, First out“ strategy 
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Figure 7:  Banks‘ share account (1993-2002) following the „Highest in, First out“ strategy 
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Figure 8:  Banks‘ share account (1993-2002) following the equally selling strategy 
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All three figures reveal that banks have great amounts of shares in their portfolio 
with historical purchase prices well above current market prices. Certainly, there are 
differences between the three trading strategies regarding the concrete amounts of 
high-purchase-price shares but the big picture is basically identical in each scenario. 
Similar is true for the low-purchase-price shares. While the „equally selling“-
strategy exhibits an ending 2002 share account with almost no shares left that are 
purchased below current market price, the LoFo-strategy leaves at least some minor 
amounts of shares in the „cheap“ layers. Following the HiFo-trading strategy leads 
to a share account with several securities historically valued at 1.000 (i.e. shares that 
are purchased before 1994), but no shares left that are purchased between 1.000 and 
6.000 points (in terms of the Dax level). However, it can be stated that for all three 
strategies the amount of low price shares available is reduced significantly compared 
to the situation at the beginning of the examination in 1994. 
Two consequences arise out of this examination: First, if banks are forced (for what-
ever reason) to write-down shares in future, this would lead to increasing expenses 
in the income statement, consequently to a lower net income and finally to lower 
contribution ratios. Thus, corporate financing possibilities of non-financial compa-
nies might be reduced by this depreciation threat. Second, the lack of cheap shares 
decreases management’s ability to operationally smooth earnings in future, because 
there are no longer any hidden reserves left to be released. With no gains from the 
sale of shares both net income and contribution ratios will be lower. That means, 
corporate financing possibilities are again reduced because of fewer possibilities for 
extraordinary income. 
To quantify the consequences for corporate financing activities of SMEs we put 
these share account figures into relation to banks‘ own funds and the amount of 
loans granted to non MFIs (similar to the proceeding in section 2.1). We first deter-
mine the impact on the income statement for each of the three scenarios assuming 
that banks had to write-down all overvalued shares in the end of 2002.17 In a next 
step, the implications of these write-downs on banks‘ own funds are determined. Fi-
nally, it is shown what that means for the amount of loans held by banks, assuming 
that they are operating at the regulatory limit. We also shed some light on the possi-
bilities to offset the write downs with capital gains from the sale of shares. Our cal-
culations are all based on the end-of-2002 Dax level which has been approximately 
2.900 points. 
Tabel 2 exhibits the consequences of share revaluations on the amount of loans 
grantable, broken down by negative effects due to write-downs and positive effects 
due to write-ups. The net amount in the last line indicates the reduction in loans 
grantable resulting from the total fair valuation of all shares.  
                                           
17  While this did not happen actually, it demonstrates what might happen in future. The reference 
year 2002 was chosen because of illustration purposes and data availability reasons. 
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Table 2:  Future opportunities and threats to banks‘ balance sheets and SME corporate 
financing possibilities 
 Trading strategies 
in mio. € LoFo HiFo Equally selling 
Write-downs of the share ac-
count 
17,216.97 24,162.59 24,934.01 
Reduction in „banks own funds“  4.31 % 6.05 % 6.24 % 
Reduction in loans grantable 
(assuming maximum operating 
strain with regard to Principle 1) 
129,977.26 182,412.28 188,236.01 
 
Gains from the sale of shares 
(maximum amount) 
11,654.86 11,952.75 1,184.31 
Increase in „banks‘ own funds“ 2.92 % 2.99 % 0.30 % 
Increase in loans grantable (as-
suming maximum operating 
strain with regard to Principle 1) 
87,986.82 90,235.69 8,940.80 
+ 
Net reduction in loans grantable 
(assuming maximum operating 
strain with regard to Principle 1) 
41,990.45 92,176.59 179,295.21 
 
To assess these numbers economically sound, one should recall that the calculation 
relies on several limiting assumptions. Additionally, the figures indicated in the ta-
ble clearly overstate the impact of stock market volatility on corporate financing ac-
tivities of non-financial companies for at least three reasons. First, not all shares 
have to be written down at one single moment. In many cases it is still up to man-
agement discretion how to proceed with shares that have a book value exceeding the 
market value. Second, not every bank has to write down these overvalued shares. 
Certainly, those banks that wish to change to IAS/IFRS are obligated to revalue as-
sets but there will remain many institutes that still rely on the German accounting 
system. Thirdly, stock markets have experienced a rebound in 2003 which clearly 
mitigates the impact of potential share write downs. To illustrate the latter point, 
figure XX highlights the change in banks‘ own funds due to write-downs and write 
ups of shares to the fair market value for different Dax levels. It can be seen that 
banks would realise a relative increase in own funds and thus in loans grantable al-
ready at a Dax level of 4.000 (Dax at the end of 2003: 3,965.16) assuming the LoFo- 
or HiFo-scenario. Assuming the equally selling strategy, however, the break even 
would be reached not under a Dax level of 5,600. Nonetheless, it can be concluded 
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that future depreciation only causes a threat to corporate financing activities of non-
financial companies if international stock markets experience a devastating stock 
market crash and all banks have to change to a fair value accounting and simultane-
ously banks are operating at the regulatory limit. The first two assumptions are very 
unlikely to happen but their occurrence is not totally impossible. However, to get a 
complete picture, we have to shed some more light on the degree of banks‘ operating 
strain, which is done in the next section. 
Figure 9: The impact of „Fair Value Accounting“ on corporate financing possibilities of 
non-financial companies 
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2.4 Banks‘ operating strain with regard to Principle 1 
As mentioned above, the assumption that banks are effectively restricted by the 
Principle 1 is crucial for the validity of our analysis. Actually, however, banks are 
far from operating at this regulatory limit. Figure XX reveal that the capital / 
weighted risk assets-ratio of German banks noticeably exceeds the required 8 per-
cent in every year under examination. Additionally, the ratio dramatically increased 
during the last years. However, assuming the importance of the balance sheet chan-
nel in assessing the impact of stock market volatility for corporate financing activi-
ties of non-financial companies, we should have expected a rather decreasing capital 
/ risk assets ratio since 2001. 
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Figure 10: Capital / weighted risk assets-ratios (1994-2003) 
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Source: Annual Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank (1994-2003) 
The meaning of these ratios becomes clearer when putting it into relation of the ex-
aminations already conducted. Taking e.g. the ratio in 2002, which is approximately 
12.6, we can see that even a reduction of about 36.5 per cent would not force the 
banks to cut investments due to regulatory reasons. This number is by far bigger 
than the maximum possible reduction in own funds that could arise from a stock 
market downturn. 
The explanatory power of these figures is mitigated a little bit, since it has to be as-
sumed that the increase in ratios is also due to banks preparation for the imminent 
new capital requirements of Basel II. However, it is not likely that banks will be op-
erating at the regulatory limit once the new requirements become effective since 
even in the long term these ratios clearly exceeded the 8 per cent minimum require-
ment hurdle. This observation is consistent with the „buffer theory“, which says that 
banks typically hold capital buffers in order to adequately react on unexpected in-
vestment opportunities or to cushion the effect of external shocks.18 That in turn 
would indicate that banks are consciously well prepared to any negative impact aris-
ing from unfavourable stock market movements. 
To summarise: Taken together, these three examinations – the analysis of the factual 
impact of the balance sheet channel, the analysis of future threats to the balance 
sheet and the examination of banks‘ operating strain – indicate that the bank balance 
sheet channel is without any major importance for the analysis of the relationship 
between stock market volatility and corporate financing possibilities of non-financial 
                                           
18  See Berger et al. (1995) 
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companies. This result is consistent with the view provided by the German Sachver-
ständigenrat in 2003.19 
3 The corporate balance sheet channel 
3.1 Theoretical foundations 
The availability of debt financing of non-financial companies heavily depends on the 
degree of creditworthiness which in turn is a function of the development and level 
of several financial fundamentals and some qualitative characteristics. In contrast to 
the analysis of a planed increase in equity capital – which rather focuses on the fu-
ture operating performance and on the ability to generate cash flows available to 
shareholders – the analysis of the creditworthiness of a company strictly focuses on 
the ability to repay the funds borrowed. 
The volatility of stock prices affects this repaying capability in especially two ways. 
First, it influences the liquidity of a company. If a firm plans to sell assets to pay 
down debt obligations, a downturn of equity prices would lower the market price of 
these assets and therefore limit the cash flow potential of security sales. Contrary to 
that, the operating cash flow is positively affected by a stock market downturn. Usu-
ally, lower stock prices lead to higher write-downs on shares held at the asset side of 
the balance sheet.20 This in turn leads to lower tax expenses due to the write-down 
tax savings and consequently to a higher cash flow from operations. Second, it in-
fluences the default risk of the company. A decrease in value of shares held at the 
asset side of the balance sheet reduces their use as collateral. This is especially true 
for borrowings which are secured with a pledge of shares. However, it is important 
to consider that also unpledged shares serve as a general security for the outstanding 
debt. For corporations a stock market downturn might lead to an additional increase 
of the default risk because the market value of shareholders equity at the liability 
side of the balance sheet – which can be seen as a mirror of the market value of all 
assets owned by shareholders – also loses value. The consequences for the default 
probability of a company become clearer when looking at the ratio of the market 
value of equity to the book value of total liabilities. A company with a high ratio 
(e.g. equity 200 € and debt 100 €) could experience a large drop in asset value be-
fore suffering from bankruptcy; a company with a low ratio (e.g. equity 100 € and 
                                           
19  See Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2003), p. 
115-116. 
20  See Section XX for a detailed description of when and how companies have to write down im-
paired shares under German GAAP. 
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debt 200 €) will be insolvent if the total asset value decreases only slightly. Thus, 
the market value of equity serves as a cushion for loses on asset values.21 
Our analysis focuses on both the ability to use share sales to repay debt and on the 
changing default risk due to changes in the market value of shareholders equity. 
Both investigations emphasise the impact of stock market movements on the non-
operating business of a company. We do not investigate the consequences of stock 
market volatility on the regular business of a company for two reasons. First, operat-
ing cash flow is affected by the tax benefit only due to higher write-downs in the 
case of a stock market downturn. That favourably influences the liquidity of a com-
pany and therefore does not pose a threat for these companies. Second, the impact of 
tax savings from write-downs on shares is usually low for non-financial companies, 
especially since these write-downs are not systematic but rather happen sporadically. 
Thus the write-down tax savings can not serve as an automatic stabiliser of corporate 
liquidity, neither. 22 That means that in general stock market movements have no ma-
jor impact on the operating business of a non-financial company. 
For our analysis we use balance sheet data for German corporations as well as mar-
ket values of some balance sheet items. The data stem from the German Finanzie-
rungsrechnung published by the German Bundesbank23 and the Ertragslage und Fi-
nanzierungsverhältnisse der deutschen Unternehmen24. Due to limited data avail-
ability our analysis has to focus on German corporations. We will come back to 
what that means for the financing possibilities of companies that are not corpora-
tions at the end of this section. 
3.2 The impact of stock market volatility on corporate liquidity 
In this section we concentrate on the liquidity of a company that is necessary to pay 
down debt. A company has principally three ways to repay debt. The first – and most 
important – way is to use the cash flow from operations. Since for non-financial 
companies the core business is not directly depending on capital markets develop-
ment (such as for brokerage firms, insurance companies and banks), this repayment 
variant is largely unaffected by sudden increases or decreases in stock prices. As 
noted above, the influences of the tax savings which come from write-downs on 
                                           
21  See Altman (2000), p. 8-9. 
22  This does not preclude that in some cases single companies can greatly benefit from the tax 
savings on write-downs on investments. A recent example is the Vodafone/Mannesmann case 
where Vodafone plans a 50 bill Euro write-down for tax reasons (Teilwertabschreibung) of as-
sets acquired in the Mannesmann-merger. This proceeding – mandated by the German tax law 
if the market value of assets has fallen short of the carrying cost – would noticeably lower the 
tax expenses and consequently increase Vodafone’s cash flow. 
23  See Bundesbank (2003b). 
24  Published each year in April as part of the Monatsbericht of the German Bundesbank 
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shares are only of minor importance. The second way to raise funds for paying off a 
loan is refinancing. Especially short term debt is sometimes refinanced and thus 
rolled over from one period to the other. Refinancing essentially does not reduce the 
debt amount of a company but rather postpones the repayment. Certainly, the ability 
of a company to refinance debt crucially depends on the conditions at capital mar-
kets (interest rate level, absorbing power of the market, etc.). However, it usually 
does not depend on the level and development of the stock market – assuming that 
the stock market is largely unaffected from the debt and money market. The third 
way is to sell assets to generate immediate cash for repayment. This approach is of 
minor importance for companies, and borrowers usually only go for it if the two 
other sources of finance are exhausted. However, if asset sale is a necessary pro-
ceeding then companies typically prefer the sale of shares held at the asset side of 
the balance sheet. The advantage of share sales compared to the sale of operating 
assets is that share sales typically do not reduce the future cash flow from operations 
and therefore do not restrict the future repayment potential of a company. Obvi-
ously, the success of share sales highly depends on the level and development of 
stock markets: the amount of funds raisable is a direct function of the market prices 
of equities. 
To investigate how stock market volatility influences the liquidity of a company we 
analyse the ability of a company to repay short term debt obligations via the sale of 
shares. This is done by examining the development of the share-liquidity ratio over 
the years 1992-2002, where the share-liquidity ratio is defined as: 
debttermshortofvaluemarket
sharesofvaluemarketratioliquidityshare = . 
This ratio is measured at market values rather than at book values because we are 
only interested in realisable values for assets as well as for liabilities. Effectively, the 
share-liquidity ratio is an adjusted current ratio (current assets to current liabilities) 
respectively cash ratio (cash + marketable securities to current liabilities). These two 
ratios are measures of the liquidity of a company generated by short term assets. 
Both ratios only differ in the assumption of which part of the current assets is used 
to fulfil the short term liabilities repayment.25 The ratio in our investigation also 
measures the liquidity of a company generated by asset sales based on the assump-
tion that only shares are used to pay down debt. This ratio is a quite reasonable li-
quidity indicator for companies that do not have any excess cash or cash equivalents. 
Moreover, it emphasises the dependence of a company on stock market volatility 
when managing their liabilities. We are focusing on short term (interest bearing) li-
                                           
25  Regarding an in depth presentation of ratio analysis to assess a company’s financial situation, 
see Peemöller (2003), pp. 331-386. Current assets are assets that are expected to leave the com-
pany within the next period while current or short term liabilities are liabilities that become due 
within the next period. 
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abilities in the denominator rather than on all current assets because the goal of our 
analysis is to determine the impact on debt financing possibilities. However, we are 
aware that a bad accounts payable management can also trigger financial distress 
and thus, usually accounts payable have to be covered by short term assets as well. 
For our analysis it is sufficient to assume that the company’s operating credit-debit 
management is in equilibrium which means that accounts payables equal accounts 
receivables. 
Figure 12 shows the development of the share-liquidity ratio for the years 1992-
2002. As expected, the ratio increases with the rise of stock prices and decreases 
with the downdraft. An important result is that the value of the share-liquidity ratio 
does not fall below “one” in either year. “One” is the critical value for this ratio 
since a ratio higher than “one” indicates that the company has enough financial 
flexibility to always fulfil its debt repayment duties. More precisely, in the event of a 
financial hardship due to low operating cash flows and bad access to capital markets, 
the company can still use share sales to pay off its entire debt obligations for this 
period. Contrary to that, a share-liquidity ratio value below “one” indicates that a 
company can no longer meet its full obligations if the firm’s operating business goes 
through a sudden decline and if external sources of capital are unavailable.26 
Figure 11:  Share-liquidity ratio for German non-financial corporations (1992-2002) 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, ZEW 
                                           
26  This interpretation is similar to the interpretation of other liquidity ratios like the current ratio, 
quick ratio or cash ratio, see Peemöller (2003), p. 362-367. 
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The figure indicates that German corporations in general did not face major liquidity 
problems due to the high stock market volatility during the last decade. Even in the 
year 2002, where financial markets experienced a tremendous slump in asset prices, 
German companies in general had enough potential liquidity at the asset side of the 
balance sheet. 
These results, however, require some further explanations. First, our analysis only 
comprises German corporations; partnerships and sole proprietorships have not been 
part of our investigation. It can reasonably be assumed that companies that are not in 
the status of a corporation hold fewer shares at the asset side of the balance sheet. 
This might be due to the lower capital market orientation of these companies in gen-
eral. However, we think that these potential differences in the amount of shares held 
are not significant and therefore our results largely hold for smaller companies, too, 
although we can not support our hypothesis because of a lack of data.  
Second, while in general the liquidity of German corporations is not affected, this 
does not preclude that single companies suffered from the stock market downturn. 
Probably, some of these companies ran out of liquidity, did not have enough shares 
or other assets for selling and experienced bankruptcy. Thus, following our analysis 
we can only state that a liquidity crisis due to stock market movements is supposably 
not a general problem in Germany. 
Third, from an economic point of view the results have to be handled with care. 
Since asset sales are typically applied only if both cash flow from operations and 
capital market or bank debt refinancing can not serve as a mean to repay the debt 
obligations, this variant is only important if the company has problems in its core 
operating and financing activities. Consequently, a strong ability to generate cash via 
asset sales rather represents a default risk cushion than a liquidity provider in the 
recurring business of a company. Therefore, such a repayment strategy should rather 
be regarded from the viewpoint of a company crisis. This, in turn, directly leads to 
the following section, where we shed more light on the default risk of a company 
and how it is related to stock market movements. 
3.3 The impact of stock market volatility on the default risk of a 
company 
Default risk of a company is defined as the risk that the borrower can not pay down 
debt anymore, not because of a short term liquidity crisis but because of insufficient 
resources in general. Therefore, default refers to as the principal failure of the oper-
ating and core business of a company. Lenders are overly concerned about the de-
fault risk of a borrower. Consequently, to assess the creditworthiness of a company, 
one of the main tasks of banks is to predict the probability of financial distress of the 
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borrower. Thus, the corporate financing possibilities heavily depend on and are 
negatively correlated to the default risk of a company. 
Stock market volatility affects the default risk of a company especially because the 
market value of assets is traded at stock markets. The market value of assets in turn 
is one of the main determinants of the solvency of a company: the higher the market 
value of assets (all other things being equal) the lower the default risk of a company 
and vice versa.27 The aim of this investigation is to determine how much influence 
changes in the level of stock prices have on the probability of default of a company. 
Our investigation is based on a model for assessing the distress of industrial corpora-
tions: the so called Z-Score Model.28 This model uses multi discriminant analysis to 
generate an overall score for each company at a specific point in time. While dis-
criminant analysis is not a popular statistical technique in general, it is often applied 
in predicting bankruptcy.29 The Z-Score Model comprises five discriminant coeffi-
cients (different financial ratios) which have proven to predict distress quite accu-
rately. Although the basics of the model have been developed more than 35 years 
ago, it is still used by many practitioners today. 
The Z-Score Model takes the following form: 
1 2 3 4 51.2 1.4 3.3 0.6 0.999Z X X X X X= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
where 
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets 
X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
X3 = Earnings before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets 
X4 = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Debt 
X5 = Sales/Total Assets 
                                           
27  See the example in the theoretical foundations of this section for an illustration of how market 
values of assets and default risk are correlated. 
28  See Altman (1968), Altman (2000) 
29  See e.g. Fulmer et al. (1984). 
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A company is classified as failed if the Z-Score falls below 1.8, a firm with a score 
exceeding 2.99 is regarded as free from default risk. Between these two numbers the 
firm is in the zone of indifference.30 
Table 3: Zones of discrimination of the Z-Score Model 
Z-Score Classifications 
Z > 2.99 “Safe”- Zone 
1.80 < Z < 2.99 “Grey”- Zone 
Z < 1.80 “Distress”- Zone 
Source: Altman (2003) 
The coefficients X1, X2, X3 and X5 are directly related to the operating business of a 
company. Coefficient X4, however, is only indirectly related to the operating busi-
ness via the stock market estimation of the market value of assets. Moreover, if 
stock price levels change (for reasons of simplicity we assume independence be-
tween stock market movements and the development of the operating business of the 
company here), the value of the coefficients which are directly to operating business 
related changes only slightly. E.g., in case of a write-down of shares held at the asset 
side of the balance sheet both the nominator and the denominator are reduced for the 
ratios X1, X2 and X3. Coefficient X5 changes favourably because of a reduction of the 
denominator which leads to an increase of the ratio; however, this change is negligi-
ble in most cases. 
Contrary to that, Coefficient X4 exhibits a high elasticity to stock price movements 
because a change in stock price levels directly reduces the nominator by the same 
percentage amount while typically leaving the denominator unchanged. The direc-
tion of the change in the coefficient is such that a decrease in stock prices reduces 
the overall score of the model and vice versa. Therefore, low stock prices generally 
lead to a higher probability of default according to the Z-Score Model. 
                                           
30  See Altman (2003), p. 6. 
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Figure 12:  Equity-debt ratio of German non-fnancial corporations (1994-2002) 
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Figure 13: Z-Score Model contribution of the equity-debt ratio of German non-financial 
corporations (1994-2002) 
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Figure 13 reveals the development of the “market-value-equity-to-book-value-debt 
ratio” for all German Corporations in the years 1994 to 2002 and figure 14 exhibits 
the contribution of this ratio to the overall score of the Z-Score Model. Comparing 
the two years 1999 and 2002, it can be seen that the score contribution was lowered 
by about 0.9 during that three year time period. With regard to the zones of dis-
crimination of that model, it becomes obvious that the decrease in stock prices might 
have a dramatic impact on the default probability of companies. Certainly, in general 
the observed stock market development did not transfer a default risk free company 
to a company with a high probability of distress (i.e. the stock market development 
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did not transfer a company from the safe-zone to the distress-zone). However, the 
impact of stock price movements has been high enough to take many of the former 
“good” companies to the grey zone, where no definite estimates about their financial 
solvency can be made. Moreover, if companies have already been in that zone of 
indifference in 1999, they are probably estimated as default companies in 2002, with 
the dramatic impact on their corporate financing possibilities. Figure XX highlights 
the possible changes in default risk estimates for the years 1999 and 2002 according 
to the Z-Score Model, where each arrow represents the change for one company. 
The different arrows are just examples of where a company’s Z-Score shifts to in 
2002 (arrowhead) if its score in 1999 is indicated by the foot of the arrow. Once 
again, it can be illustrated that even if no company is transferred directly from the 
safe-zone to the distress-zone, there might be many companies whose rating is 
downgraded from the safe-zone to the grey-zone or from the grey-zone to the dis-
tress-zone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Altman (2003), ZEW 
The conclusion regarding the impact of stock market volatility on the corporate fi-
nancing possibilities of non-financial companies via the corporate balance sheet 
channel is as follows: While a down turn in stock prices typically does not lead to a 
major deterioration of the liquidity of a company, there is a high impact on the de-
fault risk of a company perceived by market participants. However, the investigation 
only revealed that stock market volatility is of very high importance in the case of 
stock listed corporations. The probability that not listed companies become dis-
tressed, presumably does not depend that much on stock market movements since 
data of the market value of equity of those companies are not readily available and 
therefore credit analysts have to rely on other – less capital market related – indica-
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Figure 14: Impact of stock price volatility on the Z-Score Model 
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tors to assess creditworthiness. Contrary to that, many analysts determine market 
values of not-listed companies using some form of comparable company valuation 
with listed companies as comparable companies.31 Therefore, it can be concluded 
that even for not listed companies the movements of share prices are not negligible 
at all when assessing the default risk of a company. 
To put it in context of the corporate financing possibilities of non-financial compa-
nies: Default risk makes up a major part of credit risk and the degree of default risk 
inherent to a company therefore crucially determines the creditworthiness. Conse-
quently, the corporate balance sheet channel has to be regarded as a channel of high 
influence for our investigation. Even if the concrete reduction in loans granted by 
banks due to the downturn of stock markets between 1999 and 2002 can not be de-
termined here, it has to be assumed that it is a material reduction. 
4 Credit supply, credit demand and stock markets in an  
econometric perspective 
The preceding analysis has shown that when looking at banks’ balance sheets there 
is little evidence that the stock market boom and the following decline in the late 
1990s impacted the credit market. However some influence is evident on the (per-
ceived) default risk of borrowers. In the following section we complement this ap-
proach with a time series analysis of the credit market to scrutinise whether the de-
velopment of the stock market has any econometrically significant influence on 
credit demand or supply.   
Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 give a first impression of the possible links between the credit 
volume of different groups of banks and the development of the stock market. Fig. 1 
shows the annual changes of the credit volume to enterprises and self employed per-
sons (excluding mortgages) 32 , taken from all banks, Großbanken (4 large private 
banks)33, Savings Banks, and Cooperative Banking Associations and is compared to 
the annual changes of the German Composite DAX (CDAX)34. Obviously tight co-
movement of the credit aggregates and the stock market does not take place in the 
short run. Fig. 2 shows the same series in levels (calculated from cumulative 
changes of the credit volume): From this perspective a long run relationship between 
                                           
31  See Peemöller et al. (2002), p. 198. 
32  We thank Rolf-Dieter Werner from the Deutsche Bundesbank for providing data on changes of 
the credit volume in this particular definition. 
33  This aggregate comprises the Deutsche Bank AG, the Commerzbank AG, the Dresdner Bank 
AG since Jan. 1999 the HypoVereinsbank AG and since Dec. 2004 the Postbank AG. We con-
tinue to use the German expression to designate this particular aggregate.) 
34  The CDAX is the most comprehensive German stock index, it includes all German shares in the 
Prime and General Standards.  
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the credit volume and the stock market seems likely. 
Since the series in levels are obviously non-stationary, we have to use a cointegra-
tion analysis to search for long run relationships between the stock market indicator 
and the credit volume. 
Figure 15: Credit volume and stock market – annual changes 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, EcoWin, credit volume seasonally adjusted for statistical breaks 
and season effects. 
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Figure 16: Credit volume and the stock market – levels 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, EcoWin, credit volume: cumulative changes  from 1980 to 2004, 
adjusted for statistical breaks and season effects. 
4.1 Empirical evidence in the literature 
Recent econometric analyses of the German credit market have been carried out by 
the Deutsche Bundesbank (2002, 2005), the German Council of Economic Experts 
(Sachverständigenrat, 2002), Detken/Lang (2003) and Schmidt/Nehls (2004). The 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2002) has estimated error correction models with GDP and 
interest rates as explanatory variables for differently defined credit volumes. The 
results show no cointegration for any credit aggregate except for consumer credit 
during the period ranging from the first quarter of 1980:1 to the second quarter of 
2002:2. However, further segmentation into two periods, one being before and one 
after the German reunification yields significant and plausible results for both time 
periods. For the second period, a time trend is included in the model.  The Bundes-
bank concludes that the long run relationship between credit volume, GDP and in-
terest rates is stable. Although, since 2000, the actual credit volume is below the ex-
plainable growth rates, there is no significant evidence of major supply restrictions 
on the credit market. However, the difference between actual and explicable credit 
volume leaves some room for speculation in other influences on the credit volume, 
among them being lending restraints between banks.  
The German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat) analyses the credit 
demand in an error correction-framework which includes credit volume (to enter-
prises and self employed persons), GDP, long term and short term interest rate dur-
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ing the time period ranging from the first quarter of 1970 to the second quarter of 
2002. These results also do not indicate a structural break in the relation between 
theses aggregates. Out of sample forecasts based on this model show that forecasts 
exceed the actual credit volume, however the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. In their annual report 2004, the Sachverständigenrat has confirmed that the re-
sults still hold even if the time period is extended to the first quarter of 2004. 
Detken and Lang estimate the relationship between (proxied) new loan commit-
ments, GDP and long term interest rates for time interval from the first quarter 1993 
to the second quarter 2003. They conclude that since 2003 new loan commitments 
deviate substantially from the long term relationship with the other macroeconomic 
variables.  
Only Schmidt and Nehls focus explicitly on the impact of the stock market devel-
opment on the credit supply in a disequilibrium model, mainly analysing the period 
starting from first quarter of 1993 and continuing to the second quarter of 2003. 
They specify a loan supply function with bank capital as a proxy for bank lending 
capacity, the German stock market indicator CDAX (Composite DAX) as an indica-
tor for unrealised gains/losses of (bank owned) stocks and an interest rate spread as a 
proxy for credit risk. The simultaneously estimated demand function contains GDP 
as a variable for economic activity, an interest rate as proxy for capital costs and the 
volume of outstanding corporate bonds as an indicator for the usage of alternative 
financial resources. They find that from the last quarter of 2002 the credit market has 
most likely been restrained by the supply side and the stock market’s losses seem to 
be an important determinant of this restrictive behaviour. This seems to be the case 
particularly for “Großbanken” (large private banks), which hold relatively more 
shares and earn relatively more from share-related business activities than smaller 
banks.  
The Deutsche Bundesbank (2005) analyses the linkages between bank capital, GDP 
and the volume of credit in a vector autoregressive model from the beginning of 
1991 to the end of  2004. The results show that an initial decline of 1 per cent of the 
GDP does reduce bank lending activity significantly in the first three quarters fol-
lowing the decline. However, the reaction of bank capital is insignificantly negative: 
therefore it is unlikely that supply restrictions are the origin of the decrease in lend-
ing following a slowdown of  economic activity. However, the impact of stock mar-
ket events and their impact on bank capital have not been taken into consideration.  
4.2  Methods and Data 
The following analysis is based on two approaches. In the first approach we estimate 
single equations for both credit demand and credit supply. Both kinds of equations 
are alternatively specified with and without a stock market variable. While the inclu-
sion of the stock market variable in the supply function is straight from the argu-
 35
ments stated in chapters 2 and 3 above, its inclusion in the demand function deserves 
an explanation: In our view the stock market indicator might serve as an indicator of 
general business prospects and therefore could be related not only to credit supply, 
but to credit demand as well.  
To assess the impact of stock markets developments on the development of the 
credit volume, we analyse whether cointegration among variables can be established 
by inclusion of the stock market variable or whether an existing cointegrating rela-
tionship can be improved. We test for cointegration first by using a unit root test of 
the residuals, and by applying the McKinnon (1996) critical values. In the second 
step, we estimate an error correction model including these residuals and check the 
adjustment coefficient for cointegration by applying the Ericsson/MacKinnon (2002) 
critical values. 
The demand function is specified as  
(1) tttt CDAXiGDPD 1321 εβββα ++++=  
with 
− Dt = Realised Credit Demand (=credit volume)35 
− GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
− it = capital costs36  
− CDAXt = Composite DAX 
− ε1t = residuals 
 
The supply function is defined as 
(2) ttttt CDAXSPREADLCAPS 2321 εβββα ++++=  
with  
− St = Realised Credit Supply (credit volume)37 
− LCAPt = Lending Capacity of Banks (sum of bank capital and deposits38) 
                                           
35  Credit volume to enterprises and self employed persons (excluding mortgages). 
36  Current yield on domestic bonds. 
37  Credit volume to enterprises and self employed persons (excluding mortgages). 
38  Bank capital, sight deposits, time deposits and savings deposits. 
 36
− Spreadt = interest rate spread between loans39 and deposits40 
− CDAXt = Composite DAX 
− ε2t = residuals 
 
The error correction models are specified as  
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where Xt represents the vector of (weakly) exogenous variables and ε1t, ε2t  are the 
residuals from equations 1 and 2, respectively. 
In the second approach, we estimate a disequilibrium model similar to 
Nehls/Schmidt (2004), extending the observation period to the end of 2004 – in con-
trast to the paper of Nehls and Schmidt who ended in the second quarter of 2003. 
The supply and demand functions are specified as above. We estimate the coeffi-
cients in the disequilibrium model under the assumption that the credit volume is the 
minimum of credit demand and credit supply:  
 (4) Ct = min(St, Dt) 
Like Nehls and Schmidt we follow Maddala (1983, p. 298) and assume that ε1t and 
ε2t are independently and normally distributed. We can then write the joint probabil-
ity density function of St and Dt as the product of the density functions of single 
equations g1(D) and g2(S): 
(5) )()(),( 21 SgDgSDg =  
with the two conditional probabilities 
                                           
39  Average interest rates on current account credit from 100.000 EUR to 500.000 EUR, extrapo-
lated from he second half of 2003 with the changes of the effective interest rate on new over-
draft credit to non-financial corporations offered by German Banks.  
40  Average interest rate on savings deposits with a legal period of notice of 12 months, extrapo-
lated from the second half of 2003 with the changes of the effective interest rate on new depos-
its of non-financial corporations in Germany with an agreed duration of 12 months offered by 
German Banks. 
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The likelihood function for independent ε1t and ε2t  is 
∏ −+−=
t
tttt CGCgCGCgL )]}(1)[()](1)[({ 1221  
where G1 and G2 are the distribution functions of credit demand and supply, and g1 
and g2 are the density functions. We maximise the likelihood function by the using 
the Marquardt-Procedure implemented in EViews. 
All estimates have been separately carried out for all banks and for the Großbanken 
in order to analyse whether there is a higher impact of the stock market variable on 
the Großbanken,  whose business is more stock market related than of the average 
bank.  
Credit volume, GDP and LCAP are seasonally adjusted and deflated with the GDP-
deflator. All series, except for interest rates and spreads, are in logs. Interest rates 
and CDAX are in nominal terms. Philips-Perron-Tests (see Appendix 6.3) indicate 
that in all time intervals all variables are I(1), aside from the interest rate spread, 
which is I(0) in two observation periods. The ADF-Tests yield diverging results, 
since they indicate, in several observation periods, non-stationarity for some credit 
volumes, even in the first difference of the time series. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Demand functions 
The results (see appendix 6.4) do not show a substantial improvement following the 
inclusion of the stock market index in the demand equation if estimated over the 
whole period 1980:1 – 2004:4.  Despite the disturbances caused by the German re-
unification, the test statistic of the EG test without CDAX is almost significant. The 
inclusion of the CDAX, however, reduces the significance level. The error correc-
tion model (results not published here), on the contrary, improves slightly when the 
stock market index is included. However, in both specifications the coefficient of the 
error correction term is not significant and does not indicate cointegration. The 
specification, including only the Großbanken, yields results even worse. 
When the observation period is shortened to 1993:1 – 2004:1 in order to avoid a 
structural break caused by the German reunification, the results of the EG tests and 
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the ECM deteriorate. While with the inclusion of the CDAX, the significance of the 
ADF-statistics in the one-step EG test increases, the significance level remains be-
low the level of the longer time period. The ECM models indicate that there is no 
cointegration in either specification as well and show no improvement with the in-
clusion of the CDAX. However, estimates only including the Großbanken now show 
some improvement, particularly in the specification including the CDAX. But no 
significant cointegration on a normally applied level is observable.  
Particularly good results from the demand functions for all banks can be achieved 
only when the observation period is limited to 2003:2 (the specification is also ap-
plied by Schmidt/Nehls). With this limitation, the ADF-test for the residuals of the 
demand function is only slightly below the 10 per cent significance level in the 
specification without the CDAX and is significant on the 1 per cent level in the 
specification including the CDAX. The ECM models show the same tendency, al-
though the significance levels of the adjustment coefficients for the residual series 
do not exceed the critical 10 per cent value. Limited to the Großbanken, the results 
of all specifications are much weaker. 
4.3.2 Supply functions 
The estimates of the supply function over the whole time period yield in general low 
values for the ADF-statistic of the residuals (see appendix 6.4). The test statistic 
substantially increases when the stock market variable is included, but the value is 
far from being significant. A particularly strong increase is observable if only the 
Großbanken are included in the sample. Yet here, the coefficient remains insignifi-
cant as well.  
The ECM models (results not published here) show better results for all banks, but 
the adjustment coefficients for the residual series are also insignificant. The ECM-
results for the Großbanken show lower significance levels for the adjustment coeffi-
cient and an improvement following the inclusion of the stock market index is ob-
servable as well.  
When limiting the observation period to 1993-2004 the results, contrary to the de-
mand functions, do not deteriorate. Instead, the Engle-Granger-one-step estimates 
improve substantially. Including the stock market index the test statistic in the one 
step-EG-Test does not improve, while in the ECM model the significance of the ad-
justment coefficient of the residual series is substantially improved and weakly 
points to cointegration among the variables. The results for the Großbanken weakly 
indicate cointegration in the ECM specification with the CDAX as well, but not in 
the specification without the CDAX. 
As with the demand functions, the supply functions yield much better results for the 
period 1993:1 -2003:2. The one step residual test points to cointegration in both 
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specifications with and without the stock market indicator. In the ECM model the 
adjustment coefficient without the stock market indicator is significant as well, 
while the specification with the stock market indicator fails to be significant on a 
normally applied level. The results of the  Großbanken in both specifications are in-
significant, however by including the CDAX the relative standard error of the ad-
justment coefficient for the residuals series in the ECM model decreases and the 
ADF statistic in the one step model improves. 
4.3.3 Disequilibrium model 
The estimation of the disequilibrium model shows different results, depending on 
the observation period (see Appendix 0). While the size of the coefficients differs, 
the signs and relative standard errors for the time periods 1980: 1 – 2003:2 and 
1992:4 – 2003:2 are similar to the results of Schmidt and Nehls 2004, whose model 
is only slightly different.41  
In both periods, the coefficient for the activity variable (GDP) is positive and has a 
low relative standard deviation (z-statistic), whereas the capital cost variable is nega-
tive, but has a relatively low z-value for the longer time interval.42 The variables for 
the supply function generally show the correct signs as well: The lending capacity 
and the stock market variable have a positive impact. The spread is negative, but 
only during the period 1992:4-2003:2.43 The Z-values for the lending capacity and 
the stock market indicator are particularly high during the period 1992:4-2003:2, 
indicating that these supply side variables have a strong influence.  
Unfortunately the picture changes when the period is extended to 2004:4. The stan-
dard errors increase, the z-value for the stock market indicator now points to the in-
significance of this variable during the period 1992:4 – 2004:4. During the longer 
observation period 1980:1 – 2004:4 the standard error of the stock market indicator 
is smaller but still higher than in the period 1980:1 – 2003:2. Obviously the model 
cannot explain the continuing decrease of the credit volume that somehow stands in 
opposition to the stock market recovery during 2003 and 2004. 
When limiting the estimates to the Großbanken, the results show, in line with our 
                                           
41  Schmidt and Nehls used industrial bonds as a further explanatory variable in the demand func-
tion and used a deflated CDAX-variable. What is clear is, whether Schmidt and Nehls include 
the CDAX with a lag of one period or the simultaneous value. While equation 5 of their paper 
describes the inclusion of the lagged CDAX, the results in table 1 and 2 show results for con-
temporaneous values.  
42  The results of Schmidt/Nehls are not clear here, the value for the capital cost coefficient 1980:1 
– 2003: 1 is mistyped (-0-009). 
43  We did not use the interval 1993:1 to 2003:2 like Schmidt and Nehls because our model could 
not be solved for this period. 
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expectations, for all time periods positive coefficients for the stock market variable, 
that are substantially higher than for all banks. This finding corresponds to the em-
pirical fact that Großbanken earn a larger part of their profits from stock-related ac-
tivities and hold comparatively more shares in their own books. However, the coef-
ficients for the lending capacity variable are incorrectly signed in all estimates. This 
is also true for the GDP-coefficient during the period 1992-2004:2. 
4.3.4 Concluding remarks concerning the econometric results 
Overall, the results of the time series analysis yield some evidence that the stock 
market development has an impact on the credit volume in Germany. Estimates of 
the supply and demand functions for different observation periods show, in general, 
that the cointegration results tend to become weaker when the observation period is 
extended to the end of 2004. This is particularly true for the demand functions for 
the credit volume of all banks. Better results can be found for the credit volume of 
the Großbanken. The best results for all banks can be achieved when the observation 
period begins after the German reunification and ends in the first half of 2003, i.e. 
before the recent recovery of the stock markets.  
The result for the supply and demand functions in the single equation models show 
some improvement, particularly for the Großbanken when a stock market variable is 
included. This supports the view that the stock market development might be more 
relevant for the lending behaviour of the Großbanken than for other banks because 
the Großbanken derive more of their income from stock market related activities. 
The results of the disequilibrium model show the expected signs of the coefficients 
only in the periods ending in 2003:2. By extending the period to 2004:4 the standard 
error of the stock market variable increases, particularly for the credit volume of all 
banks. Again in line with our expectations are higher stock market coefficients for 
Großbanken, although the estimates yield implausible signs for the lending capacity 
and GDP variables. 
5 Overall conclusion 
In the first part of our paper, our analysis - concerning the factual impact of the bal-
ance sheet channel, future threats to the balance sheet and the banks‘ operating strain 
– revealed no major importance of the bank balance sheet channel for the analysis of 
the relationship between stock market volatility and corporate financing possibilities 
of non-financial companies.  
However, a possible impact of stock market movements on banks´ lending behav-
iour might be rooted in their impact on the balance sheets of corporate borrowers. 
While a downturn in stock prices typically does not lead to a major deterioration of 
the liquidity of a company, there is a high impact on the default risk of a company 
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perceived by market participants. This is certainly the case for listed corporations, 
which can, however, have follow-on effects on the valuation of non-listed compa-
nies as well. Since default risk makes up a major part of credit risk, the degree of 
default risk inherent to a company therefore crucially determines their creditworthi-
ness. Consequently, the corporate balance sheet channel has to be regarded as a 
channel of high influence on loans granted by banks.  
The results of the time series analyses yield some confirming evidence for an impact 
of stock market developments on the credit volume in Germany. However, the re-
sults are not very stable and depend on the specification of the model and on the 
time period under observation. Most observations point to a higher relevance of 
stock market developments for the lending behaviour of the Großbanken. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Calculation of contribution ratios 
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6.2 Determination of the structure of bank’s share account in 2002 
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6.3 Unit Roots Tests 
1980:1 -2004:4       
ADF 
 LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX Spread UREND 
Levels        
No. of Values 100 100 95 95 100 100 100 
No. of Lags 1 0 8 8 1 1 1 
Test 0.048 0.894 -0.962 -1.612 -1.626 -2.485 -1.303 
Prob. 0.960 0.995 0.764 0.473 0.466 0.122 0.626 
1. Differences 
No. of Values 100 100 95 95 100 97 100 
No. of Lags 0 0 7 7 0 5 0 
Test -6.036 -8.305 -3.258 -1.659 -7.645 -4.090 -7.266 
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.449 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 
Philips-Perron  
 LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX spread UREND 
Levels        
No. of Values 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Bandwith 0 3 7 7 3 7 2 
Test 0.556 0.732 -1.564 -1.482 -1.617 -2.188 -1.029 
Prob. 0.988 0.992 0.497 0.539 0.470 0.212 0.740 
1. Differences 
Uroots LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX spread UREND 
No. of Values 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Bandwith 11 4 6 5 2 3 2 
Test -5.774 -8.265 -5.983 -6.972 -7.620 -4.587 -7.203 
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
1993:1 -2004:4       
ADF Levels 
Uroots LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX Spread UREND 
No. of Values 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
No. of Lags 1 0 2 8 1 1 4 
Test -1.276 -0.295 -1.519 -1.617 -2.005 -2.512 -1.448 
Prob 0.633 0.918 0.516 0.467 0.284 0.119 0.551 
        
ADF 1. Diff. 
Uroots LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX spread UREND 
No. of Values 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
No. of Lags 0 0 1 7 0 0 3 
Test -4.309 -5.915 -1.558 -1.357 -4.906 -3.745 -4.660 
Prob 0.001 0.000 0.496 0.595 0.000 0.006 0.000 
        
PP Levels 
Uroots LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX spread UREND 
No. of Values 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Bandwith 3 1 5 4 3 4 1 
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Test -1.304 -0.346 -1.851 0.437 -1.935 -2.675 -1.721 
Prob 0.620 0.910 0.352 0.983 0.314 0.086 0.415 
        
PP 1. Diff. 
Uroots LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX spread UREND 
No. of Values 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Bandwith 2 3 2 4 0 3 3 
Test -4.323 -5.890 -2.869 -4.372 -4.906 -3.666 -4.765 
Prob 0.001 0.000 0.056 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000 
 
1980:1 -2003:2       
ADF Levels 
 LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX Spread UREND 
No. of Values 94 94 89 89 94 94 94 
No. of Lags 1 0 8 8 1 1 1 
Test 0.507 0.828 -0.475 -1.526 -1.725 -2.395 -1.349 
Prob 0.986 0.994 0.890 0.516 0.415 0.146 0.604 
        
ADF 1. Diff. 
 LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX spread UREND 
No. of Values 94 94 89 89 94 94 94 
No. of Lags 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 
Test -5.951 -8.228 -3.734 -1.548 -7.429 -4.454 -6.976 
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.505 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
PP Levels 
 LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX spread UREND 
No. of Values 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Bandwith 2 0 6 6 4 6 3 
Test 0.916 0.828 -1.068 -1.396 -1.737 -2.112 -1.084 
Prob 0.995 0.994 0.726 0.581 0.409 0.241 0.719 
        
PP 1. Diff. 
No. of Values LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX spread UREND 
Bandwith 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Test 3 1 5 6 3 2 0 
Prob -5.928 -8.224 -6.330 -7.404 -7.449 -4.372 -6.976 
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 
1993:1 -2003:2       
ADF Levels        
 LC all LC GB Kredall KredGB CDAX Spread UREND 
No. of Values 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
No. of Lags 1 0 2 8 1 1 1 
Test -0.793 -0.342 -1.334 -1.729 -1.854 -2.404 -1.653 
Prob 0.811 0.910 0.605 0.410 0.350 0.147 0.447 
        
ADF 1. Diff.        
No. of Values 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
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No. of Lags 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Test -4.215 -5.646 -1.711 -2.175 -4.581 -3.253 -4.224 
Prob 0.002 0.000 0.419 0.218 0.001 0.024 0.002 
        
PP Levels        
No. of Values 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Bandwith 2 1 4 4 3 4 1 
Test -0.736 -0.392 -1.467 -0.869 -1.783 -2.772 -1.622 
Prob 0.826 0.901 0.540 0.788 0.384 0.071 0.463 
        
PP 1. Diff.        
No. of Values 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Bandwith 1 2 3 4 1 2 2 
Test -4.193 -5.648 -3.534 -4.355 -4.574 -3.091 -4.353 
Prob 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.035 0.001 
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6.4 Single Equation Results 
Engle-Granger Residual Tests 
1980:1 - 2004:4 
without CDAX All Demand GB Demand All Supply GB Supply Prob. Critical Value
No. of Values 100 100 98 98 0.1 -3.514
No. of Lags 0 0 2 2 0.05 -3.872
Test -3.10 0.59 -0.91 -0.17 0.01 -4.441
   
with CDAX All Demand GB Demand All Supply GB Supply Prob. Critical Value
No. of Values 100 100 100 100 0.1 -3.895
No. of Lags 0 1 1 1 0.05 -4.210
Test -2.75 -1.77 -1.32 -2.56 0.01 -4.827
   
1980:1 - 2003:2 
without CDAX All Demand GB Demand All Supply GB Supply Prob. Critical Value
No. of Values 94 94 92 92 0.1 -3.518
No. of Lags 0 0 2 2 0.05 -3.833
Test -3.559 -0.507 -1.365 -0.798 0.01 -4.451
   
with CDAX All Demand GB Demand All Supply GB Supply Prob. Critical Value
No. of Values 94 94 94 94 0.1 -3.900
No. of Lags 0 0 1 1 0.05 -4.217
Test -2.988 -1.818 -1.667 -3.541 0.01 -4.839
   
1993:1 - 2004:4 
without CDAX All Demand GB Demand All Supply GB Supply Prob. Critical Value
No. of Values 48 48 48 48 0.1 -3.583
No. of Lags 3 8 3 3 0.05 -3.923
Test -0.638 -2.719 -2.843 -1.439 0.01 -4.608
   
with CDAX All Demand GB Demand All Supply GB Supply Prob. Critical Value
No. of Values 48 48 48 48 0.1 -3.987
No. of Lags 3 3 3 6 0.05 -4.335
Test -2.100 -2.852 -2.614 -1.949 0.01 -5.036
   
1993:1 - 2003:2 
without CDAX All Demand GB Demand All Supply GB Supply Prob. Critical Value
No. of Values 42 42 42 42 0.1 -3.602
No. of Lags 0 2 3 3 0.05 -3.950
Test -3.580 -1.041 -4.247 -1.828 0.01 -4.656
   
with CDAX  All Demand GB Demand All Supply GB Supply Prob. Critical Value
No. of Values 42 42 42 42 0.1 -4.012
No. of Lags 0 0 4 0 0.05 -4.370
Test -4.690 -3.322 -4.948 -2.358 0.01 -5.096
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6.5 Results of the Disequilibrium Model 
All Banks     „Großbanken“    
1980:1 - 2004:4     1980:1 - 2004:4    
Observations: 100     Observations: 100    
 Coeff. St.Err. z-Stat. Prob.     Coeff. St.Err. z-Stat. Prob.   
Const. D. 4.112 0.059 69.272 0.000  Const. D. 0.464 0.102 4.552 0.000
Interest Rate 0.005 0.004 1.191 0.234  Interest Rate -0.005 0.005 -0.955 0.339
GDP 1.895 0.041 46.208 0.000  GDP 4.164 0.124 33.471 0.000
Const. S. -6.400 1.374 -4.656 0.000  Const. S. 6.855 1.043 6.574 0.000
Lending 
Cap. 0.794 0.110 7.196 0.000  
Lending 
Cap. -0.297 0.082 -3.636 0.000
CDAX 0.142 0.040 3.586 0.000  CDAX 0.221 0.135 1.633 0.102
Spread 0.016 0.004 4.052 0.000  Spread -0.047 0.037 -1.283 0.199
Log likelihood 220.692    Log likelihood 135.050   
         
1980Q1 2003Q2     1980Q1 2003Q3    
Observations: 94     Observations: 95    
 Coeff. St.Err. z-Stat. Prob.     Coeff. St.Err. z-Stat. Prob.   
Const. D. 4.141 0.036 113.754 0.000  Const. D. 1.435 0.174 8.253 0.000
Interest Rate -0.002 0.003 -0.480 0.631  Interest Rate 0.045 0.016 2.746 0.006
GDP 1.916 0.025 75.401 0.000  GDP 2.379 0.121 19.732 0.000
Const. S. -4.449 1.079 -4.123 0.000  Const. S. 1.975 0.761 2.595 0.010
Lending 
Cap. 0.638 0.086 7.383 0.000  
Lending 
Cap. -0.199 0.086 -2.328 0.020
CDAX 0.190 0.032 5.916 0.000  CDAX 0.697 0.058 11.945 0.000
Spread 0.019 0.004 4.767 0.000  Spread 0.087 0.013 6.470 0.000
Log likelihood 226.453    Log likelihood 96.522   
         
1992-4 - 2003:2     1994:1 - 2003:2    
Observations: 43     Observations: 38    
 Coeff. St.Err. z-Stat. Prob.     Coeff. St.Err. z-Stat. Prob.   
Const. D. 3.499 0.172 20.336 0.000  Const. D. 2.583 0.281 9.177 0.000
Interest Rate -0.022 0.007 -3.357 0.001  Interest Rate 0.012 0.013 0.898 0.369
GDP 2.620 0.148 17.651 0.000  GDP 1.435 0.272 5.279 0.000
Const. S. -1.892 0.017 -112.008 0.000  Const. S. 6.016 0.467 12.891 0.000
Lending 
Cap. 0.528 0.001 384.102 0.000  
Lending 
Cap. -0.263 0.026 -10.032 0.000
CDAX 0.062 0.002 30.638 0.000  CDAX 0.334 0.036 9.261 0.000
Spread -0.011 0.002 -7.035 0.000  Spread -0.074 0.015 -4.833 0.000
Log likelihood 131.300    Log likelihood 91.054    
           
1992:4 2004:4     1992:2 2004:4    
Observations: 49     Observations: 51    
 Coeff. St.Err. z-Stat. Prob.     Coeff. St.Err. z-Stat. Prob.   
Const. D. 3.963 0.719 5.514 0.000  Const. D. 15.504 4.891 3.170 0.002
Interest Rate -0.002 0.022 -0.090 0.928  Interest Rate 0.357 0.048 7.373 0.000
GDP 2.100 0.750 2.800 0.005  GDP -11.879 4.459 -2.664 0.008
Const. S. -1.194 0.373 -3.199 0.001  Const. S. 3.634 0.390 9.307 0.000
Lending 
Cap. 0.498 0.034 14.488 0.000  
Lending 
Cap. -0.098 0.034 -2.873 0.004
CDAX 0.035 0.033 1.085 0.278  CDAX 0.283 0.047 6.038 0.000
Spread -0.027 0.007 -3.767 0.000  Spread 0.006 0.012 0.488 0.626
Log likelihood 124.921    Log likelihood  93.244   
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